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In 1853 Karl Marx wrote in reaction to the Taiping Uprising in China
“it may safely be augured that the Chinese revolution will throw a spark into the
overloaded mine of  the present industrial system and cause the explosion of  the
long-prepared general crisis, which spreading abroad, will be closely followed by
political revolution on the continent.”1 Marx may not have been aware of  the
Christian Taipings’ hellfire and brimstone millenarian beliefs, but he saw in their
rebellion a spark that could start a prairie fire of  political progress. This paper
holds Mao Zedong’s proposal in 1938 for the “Sinification of  Marxism,” which
referred to specific ways in which the foreign theory of  Marxism-Leninism could
be adapted to the concrete historical realities of  modern China, in the same
regard.2 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially recognized the Thought
of  Mao Zedong (later “Maoism”) as the guiding ideology of  the Chinese
Revolution in 1945 after years during which Chinese Marxist intellectuals includ-
ing Mao attempted to reconcile Marxism with China’s specific revolutionary situ-
ation. But despite a handful of  existing scholarship on Maoism outside China,
only a few attempts have been made to subject Mao’s groundbreaking concept
model to an analysis of  its impact in the developing world.3
This essay examines two cases through the scope of  a twin theoretical
focus: O.W Wolters’ theory of  localization and Mao Zedong’s Sinification,
which, in Mao’s words, means the blending of  Marxian universals with the “con-
crete historical practice of  the Chinese revolution” to suit the country’s unique
historical experience, struggle, and culture (termed by Mao as its
“peculiarities”).4 The first case, Peru, conveys the ways in which the orthodox
Maoist Shining Path appropriated Jose Mariátegui’s concept of  indigenismo5 and
Andean cultural and traditional norms.6 In so doing, the Party attempted to
“localize” Maoism to fit Peru’s unique geographical and cultural contexts. The
second case in Tanzania, however, provides a counter example. Chinese advisers
made concerted efforts to indoctrinate Tanzanians, but African socialism—
embodied in Nyerere’s ujamaa villagization7—prevailed over foreign ideological
influences. Nyerere and the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), later
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), drew inspiration from Nyerere’s idyllic per-
ception of  pre-colonial African life and adapted it to suit Tanzania’s current
needs rather than espouse a foreign ideology and apply it to local settings. But
Ujamaa as a uniquely “African” idea ultimately failed to make the transition from
egalitarian theory to practice.
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Abdul Rahman Babu’s critique of  African socialism, which challenges
the idea of  harmonious past equality in Africa and forwards material progress
and Maoist notions of  “voluntariness” and self-reliance as essentials, informs
this paper’s proposal that some of  the major tenets of  Maoism provide for an
alternative to capitalist development.8 Mao’s notions of  voluntarism, self-
reliance, and a worker-peasant alliance may have served as fitting models since
Mao’s “approach to Marxist analysis of  society makes practice primary,” and
since various socio-political issues arose in Julius Nyerere-era Tanzania due to
the failure to fully turn theory into practice during the period of  ujamaa villagiza-
tion.9 The study below also intends to convey the difficulty in reconciling theory
and practice and to weigh the efficacy of  localizing an ideology in settings dis-
parate of  its origin.
Twin Theoretical Focus: Localization and Sinification
Before discussing the case studies, one must first be able to view them through
the twin scopes of  Wolters’ theory on localization and Mao’s Sinification.
Historian O.W. Wolters defines the term “localization” as “calling our attention
to something else outside the foreign materials.”10 One way to conceptualize
“something else” is as a local statement of  cultural interest in which foreign ele-
ments become distanced from their original source and take shape as something
unique. 11 Such concepts and practices “have to be localized in different ways”
before they can fit into various complexes of  religious, social, and political sys-
tems and belong “to new cultural ‘wholes.’”12 Only upon the successful adapta-
tion of  the foreign idea would the fragments be embraced and understood by
the people. 
In addition, as Arnd Schneider asserts, we need to focus on the
“hermeneutic process of  appropriation, which means ‘a taking out of  one con-
text and putting in another.” 13 This process implies that cultural elements “are
invested with new signification.”14 Cultural Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai
supports this theory by stating that as “rapidly as different forces from cultural
and economic centers are brought into new societies they tend to become indig-
enized in one or other way[s].”15 However, these cultural forms are not merely
reproduced “but infused with new, locally determined meanings.”16 Michel de
Certeau asserts that the masses “always renegotiate the meanings offered them,”
which allowed the rulers or ruling class of  the society that localized the foreign
concept to proclaim the uniqueness of  the localized form.17 Thus localization is
the practice of  cultural borrowings transformed to fit unique historical, geo-
graphic, and religious contexts.
To use a Southeast Asian example, Indian customs and practices tended
to be fractured, restated, and “drained of  their original significance by a process
of  localization,” which was particularly evident in Cambodia where Indian 
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religions such as Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism developed into localized
Cambodian variants.18 The Hinduized Angkor temples that the Khmer rulers
had originally built as monuments devoted to the Hindu god Vishnu became
Theravada Buddhist sites. In only a few centuries, the Indian influence on
Cambodian society was localized to form something recognized as a uniquely
Cambodian form. Extant ideas, rites, and practices ultimately joined with exoge-
nous influences to become something that became particular to a region, culture,
or people.
Indeed, Mao Zedong’s “Sinification” of  Marxism provides us with a
recent example of  a process whereby endogenous ideas blended with foreign
concepts to create a localized form within a particular context. The
“Sinification” of  Marxism was Mao’s attempt to adapt the universality of
Marxism to China’s particular national and cultural forms. The problem was that
many Chinese intellectuals viewed Marxism as “a foreign dogma that was hostile
to the essence of  Chinese culture,” thus making its widespread acceptance an
enormous obstacle.19 To counter, Mao’s qualification of  Friedrich Engels’ for-
mulation of  historical materialism “suggested that an ideology which has its
roots in social, economic and political circumstances vastly different from those
that existed in China must be modified if  it was to serve as templates and guides
to actions.”20 Mao’s own modification of  this existing Marxist formula was the
first major step towards localizing Marxist ideology to suit China’s historical con-
text.
The next important step was Mao’s proposal in 1938 for the
“Sinification of  Marxism,” which referred to the specific ways in which the for-
eign theory of  Marxism-Leninism could be adapted to the concrete historical
realities of  modern China.21 These “realities,” as Raymond Wylie notes, included
the under-development of  capitalism, the absence of  a large urban proletariat,
and the central role of  the rural peasantry.22 He quotes Mao as stating that “[i]n
the first stage of  this complex process of  interaction, new Marxist contents will
fuse with traditional national forms, but the process will not terminate at this
point but will instead progress to a second stage in which the interaction of  con-
tent and form will transform the traditional forms into modern forms.”23 The
final product, Mao states, will be a “distinctive culture that represents the total
integration of  modern Marxist (scientific) contents and modern national
forms.”24 In so doing, Mao implemented “a strong ethos” and “a clear sense of
a separate Chinese identity” to domesticate, militarize, and nationalize revolution
in China.25
An important approach to the problem of  ideas across cultures arises
from the scholarly debate over the formulation of  “Chinese” Marxism, or
Marxism that was adaptable to China’s environment. Central to this debate are
efforts to identify Chinese Marxism as ideological continuity or divergence,
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orthodoxy or heterodoxy. As historian Nick Knight’s scholarship has shown,
Western analyses of  Mao’s Marxism cluster around three particular lines of
thinking: one that foregrounds the primacy of  Chinese nationalism in Mao’s
application; another that places power and legitimacy as the key factors; and
Knight’s position that regards Mao as a serious Marxist internationalist.
Proponents of  the first argument such as Stuart Schram hold that
Mao’s belief  in the “infinite capacity of  subjective factors to change objective
reality” rather than economic determinism broke with the very essence of
Marxism.26 Schram asserts that Mao’s nationalism and his emphasis on human
will were antithetical to Marxism since he stressed the national over the interna-
tional, and de-centered the development of  the productive forces as the motive
force for social change.27 But while these scholars are correct to address Mao’s
nationalism, the Chinese leader’s own writings give no indication that he raised
China above the internationalist struggle against capitalism and imperialism.28 As
Paul Healy shows, for example, Mao’s voluntarism did not depart from Marxist
orthodoxy, and charges that the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution
represent “utopian orgies” ignore that Mao’s underlying theoretical basis was
“consistent with the fundamental tenets of  orthodox Marxism’s conception of
social formation.”29 Knight continues the criticism of  this first line by arguing
that the stress on the Chinese influences on Li Dazhao and Mao betrays an
“Orientalist assumption” that Chinese nationalism made any form of  Marxism
in China heterodox.30 In fact, Marx and Engels recognized that the Revolutions
of  1848 throughout Europe were bourgeois-democratic and nationalist, and a
close analysis of  Chinese Marxists’ written texts reveals their careful attention to
Marxist orthodoxy.31 Therefore, to suggest that “Chinese intellectuals and
philosophers who converted to Marxism could not possibly have understood
Marxism” because it “grew out of  the European intellectual tradition… thus
posit[ing] ‘being Chinese’ as an insuperable barrier to the understanding of  a
theoretical system that originated outside the Chinese cultural hemisphere,”
holds little weight.32
A second line supported by Raymond F. Wylie positions power and
legitimacy as Mao’s ultimate goals. Wylie claims that Mao’s political secretary
Chen Boda was “the single most important figure… in helping to formulate and
propagate the concept of  Mao Tse-tung thought,” which was central to the
establishment of  Mao as the predominant leader within the CCP and provided
legitimacy for his thought.33 Mao’s Sinification of  Marxism therefore “emerged
and developed in the context of  a fierce struggle for supreme power in the CCP
between Mao and the Returned Students.”34 Although Chen’s “sufficient yet cul-
turally rooted understanding of  Marx… enable[d him] to develop Mao’s Marxism
into a persuasive Chinese ideology,” Sinification was, in Wylie’s view, an ideologi-
cal power play that Mao and Chen used in their dire struggle for legitimacy with-
in the Party.35
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A somewhat related position comes forward from Cold War historians
Karl Wittfogel and Robert North, who state that Mao Zedong was primarily
interested in applying a Soviet model to China’s unique historical context.36
Their assertion appears tenable given the CCP’s close relationship with the
Soviets and their participation in the Comintern.37As Meisner states, however,
the relationship between Stalin and Mao was very tense from as early as 1927
since Mao’s meteoric rise to atop the Communist Party hierarchy came “in direct
conflict with CCP factions backed by Stalin.”38 Lee Feigon supports this claim,
stating that Mao realized that “he had made a mistake in trying to follow a Soviet
model for China” and spent “two decades of  his life trying to tear China away
from the Soviet road.”39 Mao broke with the “consensus politics of  the
Stalinists” to weaken the heavily bureaucratic Party, which the pro-Russian
Returned Scholars used as a device to dictate the CCP’s direction.40
A third line of  interpretation argued by Nick Knight, by contrast,
returns the focus to the continuity of  ideas, thereby taking Mao’s devotion to
orthodox Marxism seriously.41 Knight argues that Mao attempted to “establish a
formula by which a universal theory such as Marxism could be utilized in a par-
ticular national context and culture without abandoning the universality of  that theo-
ry.”42 But how does this argument account for the obvious process of  localizing
Marxism within China? Arif  Dirlik asserts that Maoism represents less of  an
orthodoxy per se, and more of  “a local or vernacular version of  a universal
Marxism [that] was very much a product of  the globalization of  Marxism out-
side Europe.”43 Mao’s Sinification was thus not a question of  elevating Chinese
peculiarities above Marxian universals or the other way around, although Mao’s
nationalism as well as his internationalism are certainly apparent in “On New
Democracy.” Rather, Mao’s Marxism was an ideological endpoint; it was the step
toward becoming a complete ideology where the particular (China) worked in
concert with the universal (Marxism). Thus, Sinification represents a naturaliza-
tion, or localization, of  Marxism in a particular setting.44
In summation, Mao Zedong created a formula by which the universal
theory of  Marxism was applicable in a particular national context without the
abandonment of  the universality of  Marxian theory.45 The marriage of  universal
Marxian laws to particular laws that described China’s unique characteristics cre-
ated a genuinely Chinese Marxism.46 As we will see in the case of  Peru’s Shining
Path, the union of  a universal ideology with unique national characteristics
breathed life into a revolution that lacked a support base and a military strategy
to put its revolution in motion.47
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“PanchamaMAO:”48 The Shining Path and the Localization of  Maoism
in Peru
On 18 May 1980, Peru held elections for a civilian President after twelve years of
military rule. Just the day before, five masked members of  the Communist Party
of  Peru-Shining Path set fire to ballot boxes in the Ayachuco village of
Chuschi.49 Who were these masked revolutionaries? What was their message and
purpose for such a surreptitious operation? The Communist Party of  Peru-
Shining Path, referred to hereafter as the Shining Path or Sendero for short,
adopted Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s guiding ideology and launched a
full-fledged socialist revolution. The Chinese Communist Party defined pre-revo-
lution China with terms such as “semi-feudal” and “semi-colonial,” which res-
onated with Latin American Marxists who regarded Latin America as sharing the
same fate.50 The perception that the Chinese revolution contained “lessons” for
Latin American societies led intellectuals such as Shining Path founder Abimael
Guzman Reynoso to embark on a patronage to Beijing where he studied Mao’s
works and trained in the military art of  people’s war.51 Mao’s principle of  peo-
ple’s war provided the Shining Path with a way of  fighting and a way of  life that
embodied “a vision of  man and society and an approach to development built
on foundations of  popular participation and egalitarian values.”52 By the 1980s,
the Shining Path consolidated itself  as a Maoist organization and launched a pro-
tracted struggle that aimed—and almost succeeded—at toppling the Alberto
Fujimori government in Lima.
By no means is this paper trying to exonerate the Shining Path for their
uses of  violence and drug trafficking during and after the revolutionary struggle.
Rather, the present study adopts scholarly neutrality to evaluate its case objec-
tively. More recently, scholars have cast the Shining Path in a negative light for its
use of  terrorism, betrayal, illegal transnational cocaine trade, murder, and for
allegedly betraying their peasant/indigenous constituency during the waning
years of  the People’s War. However, these same scholars fall into a temporal trap
by foregrounding these later more radicalized methods at the expense of  giving
due attention to Sendero’s earlier policies of  indigenous outreach. Seldom have
scholars explored the much more compelling ways in which the Shining Path
attained indigenous support through the appropriation of  Jose Mariátegui’s indi-
genismo policy of  the 1920s and the evocation of  Incan legends, culture, and his-
tory.53 Sendero tried to base its revolution organically and on unique local condi-
tions. For these reasons, the section examines the ways in which the Shining Path
created a synthesis of  Maoist precepts with Marategui’s Peruvian socialism and
Andean cultural norms.
Before exploring the Shining Path’s localization, we must investigate the
present scholarly arguments in the field of  contemporary Peruvian history.
Historians such as Olin Starn, Carlos Degregori, Robin Kirk, and Daniel
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Masterson assert that the Shining Path never truly reached out to the indigenous
population. Among those few who argue otherwise, they also posit that the
Shining Path betrayed the Andean peoples through top-down elitist treatment of
indios and, in cases, violence directed against their indigenous followers. Starn,
Degregori, and Kirk argue that the Shining Path’s class-based ideology “is
notable for a complete absence of  appeals to ‘Indian’ or ‘Andean’ pride.”54 In
fact, Starn argues that the Shining Path’s ideology “eschewed completely any
appeal to 'indigenous' or 'Andean' roots” while the Party’s political culture
focused almost exclusively on class struggle, anti-imperialism, and on the Party's
primacy in revolution.55
The same scholars also argue that the Shining Path “failed to build
broad support among Peru’s poor majorities” since their radical people’s war in
mountainous Ayachuco went down as “a gripping, yet historically doomed
anachronism.”56 Degregori argues that the Shining Path’s relationship with Peru’s
peasants was particularly ambiguous since the party took “a top down approach”
to their treatment of  peasant and indigenous recruits.57 The Shining Path insist-
ed that the Party had to serve the masses and bring them harmony, but had to
“educate them and coerce them into support when necessary.”58 Alex Cook,
meanwhile, asserts that the Shining Path “was supposed to be a creative acclima-
tization of  Marxism to the Andean highlands,” but instead “assimilated many of
the same feudal and colonial social divides it had intended to destroy.”59
Nowhere is this more evident in the Shining Path’s forcibly imposed “war plant-
ing schedule upon the villagers” and its serious disruption of  their intricate agri-
cultural cycle.60 Thus as Degregori argues, Sendero was primarily a movement of
intellectuals, left-of-center activists, and disillusioned Peruvian youths.61
In the same vein, historian Daniel Masterson asserts that the Shining
Path was “never a peasant-based insurgency” since the “strategic equilibrium” that
Sendero Luminoso62 hoped to achieve in the countryside “was never achieved because
of  the insurgency’s misunderstanding and terrible abuse of  the peasantry.”63 The Party’s
shift of  the anti-government campaign to Peru’s capital and largest urban center
in Lima alienated much of  the Shining Path leadership and “broke with Maoist
principles.”64 Starn, meanwhile, argues that the gradual government withdrawal
from the countryside “meant a cut off  of  modest outside support for projects
like clinics, schools, and small irrigation projects.”65 Such led to the emergence
of  peasant self-defense brigades known as Rondas Campesinas.66 As Peru’s peas-
antry felt alienated and wanted to distance themselves from the radical Maoist
movement due to the insurgency’s destruction of  Peru’s rural infrastructure,
many peasants organized into defense brigades to ward off  Shining Path mem-
bers from entering the villages.67
Yet these scholars do not offer enough evidence to challenge the argu-
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ment that the Shining Path’s ideology resonated with groups of  indigenous peo-
ples. Instead, anti-localization scholars rely on various Truth and Reconciliation
Commission tropes to foreground the later period, which makes Sendero’s radical-
ization, excessive violence, and drug trade stand in for their earlier policies of
indigenous outreach.68 The Shining Path’s appropriation of  Peruvian Marxist
Jose Carlos Mariátegui’s ideology of  indigenismo and the subsequent synthesis of
Maoist precepts with Incan cultural forms and traditions must receive due atten-
tion since these policies did resonate with indigenous peoples. Rather than rely
on evidence forged around a temporal slippage, we must examine the ways in
which Peru’s marginalized Andean peoples regarded these two “uniquely
Peruvian” concepts as essential parts of  a new Peru that could one day improve
their standard of  living.
Due to the Peruvian state’s concerted effort to eradicate the “ethnic
question” and its effort to turn its indigenous population into peasants, Peru’s
indigenous peoples had yet to form a strong national movement.69 The Shining
Path presented a new face to Peru’s political culture that encouraged indigenous
peoples to reject the subordinate status imposed on them for centuries.70 The
Ayachuco peasants embraced Guzman’s version of  Mariátegui’s indigenismo and
began to enlist members from various communities to fight for their cause.
In order to grasp the complexity of  the Shining Path’s localization,
something must be said of  Jose Carlos Mariátegui. In the late 1920s, Mariátegui,
described as one of  the “few original Marxist theoreticians Latin America has
ever produced,” established the Socialist Party of  Peru.71 Mariátegui recognized
that Peru was a plagued country that suffered from semi-feudal and semi-colo-
nial subordination at the same time.72 While Marxian theory alienated world
peasantries due to its focus on industrial sectors, Mariátegui centered his ideas on
the “reality of  Peruvian poverty, race, class conflict, and neo-colonialism.” 73 He
strongly believed that Peru offered a unique and interesting model for a ground-
breaking form of  Latin American socialism.74 As Masterson notes, Mariátegui
identified in the “reciprocal communalism of  Andean social tradition” a form of
“communism.” 75 His communism was a great improvement over the highly
“exploitative, individualistic, and foreign-dominated policies” that marginalized
the indigenous peoples and stripped Peru of  its burgeoning potential as a conti-
nental economic force.76 Mariátegui thus saw the solution to Peru’s semi-feudal
and semi-colonial subjugation in the application of  traditional Andean social
models to a contemporary socialist Peruvian state.77
One of  the keys to understanding the importance of  Mariátegui’s indi-
genismo and further contributions to modern Peruvian socialism78 is to “recog-
nize his unique willingness to use traditional Andean social norms as a workable
model” for Peru’s current historical contexts.79 The Peruvian Marxist asserted
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that traditional models of  Andean socialism could be applied to modern con-
texts “if  an efficient educational system emphasizing primary schooling for the
masses, technical training, and a free and accessible university system was estab-
lished as a foundation.”80 However, Mariátegui was not implying that Quechua81
Indian society required westernization of  any sort. Rather, he argued that the
ayllu—a system of  production and community that dates back to Incan times—
preserves two great economic and social principles: to “contract workers collec-
tively and to have the work performed in a relaxed and pleasant atmosphere of
friendly competition.”82 Unfortunately, Mariátegui’s uniquely Peruvian innova-
tion led to his dismissal from the Comintern conference in 1929, and he died
soon afterward.83
Despite his political ex-communication and premature death, what are
most important here are the ideas that Mariátegui set in motion. According to
historian Lewis Taylor, Mao’s concept of  semi-feudal and semi-colonial society
proved “highly compatible with Mariátegui’s description of  Peru in the first half
of  the twentieth century, with multiple coexisting worlds: indigenous peasant
communities practicing primitive agrarian communism, colonial-era haciendas
maintaining a feudal economy in the highlands, semi-feudal coastal estates pro-
ducing crops for export, and bourgeois urbanites with ties to international capi-
talism.”84 Abimael Guzman Reynoso, the future head of  the Shining Path,
explained in an interview that the more he read Mao Zedong’s works, the more
he began to see Jose Carlos Mariátegui as a “first rate Marxist-Leninist who had
thoroughly analyzed our [Peruvian] society.”85 Mariátegui’s focus on forming a
rural base from which to launch a revolution against the forces that prevented
the advancement of  Peru’s indigenous peoples became central to the formation
of  the Communist Party of  Peru-Shining Path in the 1970s. It was not surpris-
ing, then, that Guzman appropriated Jose Mariátegui, a man who spoke out in
favor of  improving the standard of  living of  the Andean peoples, and reconciled
his own fascination with Maoism to create a unique “sword of  Marxism
Leninism.” Mariátegui ultimately provided the Shining Path with an analysis of
Peru’s society while Mao Zedong “provided the strategy to change it.”86
In 1970, a philosophy professor at the National University of  San
Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayachuco, Peru named Abimael Guzman Reynoso
founded the “Shining Path”—a direct linguistic borrowing from Mariátegui’s
coining of  the term “the Shining Path to the future” in reference to Marxism.87
According to historian Olin Starn, Guzman arrived in Huamanga in 1962 from
middle-class origins in the town of  Mollendo.88 Starn describes him as a
“reserved yet self-confident man” who donned the Andean dress.89 During the
mid 1960s, Guzman became an admirer of  Mao Zedong, toured China during
the later years of  Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and received small
arms training at a Chinese cadre school.90 The Shining Path under Guzman’s
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leadership broke from the Communist Party of  Peru and embraced many of
Mao’s ideas, such as people’s war, self-reliance, Third World anti-imperialism, and
the Cultural Revolution.91 These influences led Guzman to exclaim that the
Shining Path’s armed struggle required the mobilization of  the peasants “under
the infallible banners of  Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought.”92
Furthermore, Guzman’s choice of  Ayachuco as a base from which to launch the
people’s war revolution mirrors Mao’s base in the remote Chingkanshan
Mountains where he fought three successive revolutionary civil wars against
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.93
As Guzman’s influence at the university waned, the Shining Path set up
“popular schools” to “increase class-consciousness among the peasantry, work-
ing class, and students.”94 Guzman and his disciples highlighted the Peruvian
state’s corruption, its numerous failures and shortcomings, and Mariátegui’s cre-
ative Marxist analysis of  Peruvian society.95 According to historians Michael
Arena and Bruce Arrigo, the “popular schools” emphasized the “need for class
struggle, the incompetence of  parliamentary democracy… [and] the Shining
Path’s plan for securing New Democracy.”96 Within a short period, Guzman gained
a multifarious support base of  former students and local peasants in the impov-
erished Ayachuco region and declared a war against Peru’s wealthy bourgeoisie.97
By the 1980s, the people’s war had begun.
The Shining Path entered the first stage of  Maoist revolution—agita-
tion and propaganda— in late 1970. In true Maoist fashion, the Shining Path
constructed their vanguard base on the backs of  the country’s peasantry.98 The
Shining Path called for a peasant rebellion against Peru’s large landowners for
oppressive policies that since the 1800s marginalized the Peruvian indigenous
peoples.99 With the election of  Fernando Belaunde Terry in the early 1980s,
newly reformed agricultural policies betrayed most of  the country’s agronomists
in the southern highlands.100 The Shining Path saw an opportunity to appeal to
the victimized “Indian” and wedded the suffering of  the indigenous people to
the Party’s revolutionary program, guerrilla army, and the new state they hoped
to establish in Lima after the successful fifth stage of  Maoist revolution.101
The Andean peasants relied heavily on the notion of  reciprocal eco-
nomic justice and identified with the Shining Path because its operations “acted
as a reflection, and an expression, of  their own social and economic frustra-
tions.”102 City dwellers paid very little for agricultural work and wealthy peasants
did not make significant labor contributions. Thus, many peasants vehemently
resented the upper classes. Through his use of  respondent data from the
Ayachuco region, historian Ronald Berg cogently argues that there was “consid-
erable support” for killing the mostly-mestizo103 Peruvian wealthy.104 As a num-
ber of  Andean peasants stated, “I have nothing against their killing the rich (los
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ricos)… I don't like it when they kill peasants (campesinos).”105 One sympathiz-
er stated that the men the Party killed “deserved what they got because they
were rich, had two or three houses, and had acquired their wealth through unfair
exchange.”106 Support for the Shining Path grew because the peasants and
indigenous peoples believed that the party understood their aspirations, such as
their desire to possess a measure of  autonomy at the local level and the right to
practice subsistence agriculture through land ownership.107 As Berg elucidates,
peasants held animosity toward Peru’s wealthy and bought into the Shining Path’s
social program of  improving indigenous rights.
Most importantly, the Shining Path exploited the cultural significance of
Incan myths and Andean symbolism to broaden its revolutionary support
base.108 The Shining Path espoused elements of  Quechua Indian culture, which
historian Stefano Varese states “became increasingly evident” in the Party’s activ-
ities.109 The most culturally significant myth was that of  Inkarri, which recalls a
sixteenth century event where the Spanish colonizers dismembered, scattered,
and buried the body of  the last Incan sovereign Tupac Amaru I.110 According to
Arena and Arrigo, the Shining Path represented its leader Abimael Guzman as
“the modern day incarnation of  the Inkarri.”111 Sendero posters portrayed
Guzman at the center “dressed in a suit, wearing glasses, [Mao’s red] book in
hand, surrounded by masses carrying rifles and flags, with the great red sun set-
ting behind him.”112 Since Andean mythology held that the rise of  the red sun
meant the return of  Inkarri, the Shining Path’s Indian followers gave Guzman
the Quechua title of  “Red Sun:” pukainti.113 The Shining Path’s Andean follow-
ers revered their new “Inca king” with “God-Sun adoration” and entrusted his
Party to bring the impoverished descendants of  the great Incans to a more pros-
perous and respectful future.114
Another weapon for widespread support was the evocation of  Andean
symbolism. The Spanish celebrated the execution of  Tupac Amaru I and placed
his head on a stake to discourage further indigenous uprisings. The Shining Path
argued that Tupac Amaru’s body, which stood as the quintessential Incan symbol
for the dispersal of  Indian tribes and the reverence of  Incan cultural heroes, was
slowly reconnecting in the forms of  the Peruvian clandestine movements. As
Varese, Arena, and Arrigo state, the Andean peoples believed that only when the
desecrated head of  Tupac Amaru I rejoins the rest of  the body or grows its new
body underground will the Inca nation rise up and obtain its pre-Columbian
state of  independence.115
In addition, the Shining Path revolutionaries emphasized the 199th
anniversary of  the Spanish execution of  the Quechua Incan rebel Jose Gabriel
Condorcanqui, immortalized in Incan legend as “Tupac Amaru II.”116 In the
eighteenth century, Condorcanqui launched a bloody anti-colonial revolution.
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The victorious Spanish captured Condorcanqui and sentenced him to death in
the same brutal manner that the Spanish had killed Tupac Amaru I centuries
before. Thus, according to Varese, the Andean tradition “unites symbolically all
other Indian revolutionary heroes, such as Tupac Amaru I (16th century) and
Tupac Amaru II (18th century).”117 After all, the Spanish ensured that the two
indigenous leaders suffered the exact same symbolic fate of  gruesome public
dismemberment and disjointed burial across Peru’s highlands. The Shining Path
promised that only when all the indigenous peoples of  Peru lent their support to
Pukainti and his Shining Path movement shall Peru’s “cosmic race” obtain their
long sought after salvation.118 Ultimately, the Shining Path’s appropriation of
indigenous cultural and traditional norms positioned the guerrilla organization in
place to use “ethnic survival” as part of  its aggressive recruitment strategies.119
To summarize briefly the events that followed, the Shining Path com-
pleted the second,120 third,121 and fourth122 stages of  Maoist revolution
between 1980 and 1988.123 The people’s war expanded, and by 1989, the guerril-
las prepared to launch the people’s war on Lima.124 However, the fifth and final
stage that entailed the fall of  the cities was never achieved. Nevertheless, the
Shining Path succeeded in launching “the largest insurgency on Peruvian soil
since the Tupac Amaru II rebellion two centuries before.”125 The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission noted that the armed conflict between 1980 and
2000 “constituted the most intense, extensive and prolonged episode of  violence
in the entire history of  the Republic.”126 As the people’s war raged on, the
Shining Path radicalized increasingly and launched brutal internal purges to
ensure longevity and loyalty. Abimael Guzman, now named “Presidente
Gonzalo,”127 took advantage of  his personality cult status and taught his five
thousand armed guerrillas that the Russians, Cubans, the Chinese, and North
Koreans were “weak and not true Communists.”128 The Shining Path’s official
party ideology ceased to be “Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,” and instead became
“Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo thought.”129 But Peruvian forces captured
the “great teacher” in 1992 and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Although
the People's War continued in an ever-degenerating state, Abimael “Presidente
Gonzalo” Guzman’s incarceration and subsequent official statement from prison
effectively ended the Maoist revolution in Peru.130
These later developments have wrongfully been the focus of  contem-
porary scholars on Sendero. While one cannot deny that the Shining Path was a
violent and radical revolutionary movement, the Party succeeded in “localizing”
Maoism and breathed life into Mariátegui’s indigenismo. Whether historians classify
Sendero as terrorists, revolutionaries, or freedom fighters, the Shining Path chal-
lenged the corrupt and anti-indigenismo Peruvian state and exposed the limits of
Peruvian agency. The Shining Path’s earlier devotion to indigenous activism and
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social reform must not be shrouded by their later extremism and controversial
methods. In the end, Sendero succeeded in its mission to plant the seeds of
Maoism in the Andes Mountains and watched it grow into a uniquely Peruvian
form of  socialism.
The Counter-Example: Mwalimu and Ujamaa Villagization
In 1961, British rule in Tanganyika ended in a bloodless transition of  power.
Julius Nyerere led his fledgling TANU to victory in the nation’s first democratic
elections. Shortly after Nyerere took office, he formed a special relationship131
with the People’s Republic of  China and visited Beijing.132 Maoist cadres soon
flooded the now-Tanzanian133 countryside and tirelessly promoted Mao Zedong
Thought to African workers on the TANZARA134 railway.135 Yet Nyerere insist-
ed upon the creation of  a uniquely “African” socialism for his new nation.
According to historian May Joseph, Nyerere’s socialism was predicated on “a
conscious anti-colonialist move to delink from the West’s imperial obsessions”
through which Tanzania “would create its own autonomy as a nation-state.”136
More specifically, Nyerere’s national development project known as ujamaa aimed
to transcend all existing social divisions in Tanzania. Yet ujamaa ended in disaster;
the development program failed to increase productivity and merely reproduced
many of  the social divides it intended to eradicate.137
This section examines the Tanzanian case as a counter example to
Peru’s Shining Path movement. According to historian Goran Hyden, Nyerere
regarded ujamaa as an “attempt to base development efforts on an indigenous
base instead of  borrowing models and ideas from outside.”138 The section ana-
lyzes what Nyerere thought he was doing for his people with his invented African
traditions and evaluates the debates on ujamaa by social democrat Cranford Pratt,
Marxist scholars Issa Shivji and P.L. Raikes, political scientist Leander Schneider,
and post-colonialists Goran Hyden, Jean Francois Bayart, and Michael
Schatzberg.139 The section then channels Abdul Rahman Babu’s critique of
African socialism to present Maoism—an oft-overlooked ideology given its
emphasis on politicization—as an alternative framework and examines the ways
in which Maoist precepts offer an insightful analysis to many of  the socio-politi-
cal detriments that plagued Tanzania during ujamaa villagization.
Before delving into the various analyses that are pertinent to this study,
one must first examine the reasons why Maoism became a peripheral ideology in
an independent Tanzania. Maoism was ever-present in Tanzanian society.
Chinese supervisors expected Tanzanian laborers to be inspired by Mao, “to be
determined, be afraid of  no sacrifices, to reject all difficulties and to achieve total
victory.”140 Historian Jamie Monson states that his colleague, Kim Jaycox,
remembered that at the Chinese restaurant on the rooftop of  the New Africa
Hotel in Dar es Salaam, Chinese cadres distributed Mao’s teachings and Mao
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buttons freely, and that “the back streets were filled with revolutionaries.”141 In
addition, Chinese-trained Tanzanian university students offered instruction in
small arms, explosives, and people’s war guerrilla tactics to movements outside
Tanzania, namely the FRELIMO movement in Mozambique.142
So why did Nyerere and the TANU reject Maoism as an ideology in
favour of  invented “African” traditions? The TANU marginalized Maoism for
two reasons. First, Nyerere was happily non-aligned and identified more with
Fabian socialism and Catholic social teachings than any radical dogma.143
Nyerere was a Christian and was raised and educated in the Western democratic
tradition.144 Furthermore, historians Bonnie Ibhawoh and J. Dibua assert that
Nyerere's ideology fused European concepts derived from Kantian liberalism
with an ethos inspired by his idealized communitarian native African society.145
Nyerere never wanted to sacrifice the ethic of  individualism and firmly believed
in the people’s right to elect their own representatives.146 Second, Nyerere’s
major government officials were, for the most part, anti-communist and anti-
dogmatic. Prime Minister Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa, Vice President Abeid Amani
Karume, Junior Minister R. Wambura, and Foreign Affairs and Defense minister
Oscar Kambona were all statists that rejected any form of  ideological extremism.
In fact, Kambona initially opposed ujamaa villagization in favor of  a more prag-
matic approach.147 In sum, these factors caused Maoism to become peripheral in
Nyerere’s and the TANU’s ideological pursuits.
In order to grasp the complexity of  the scholarly debates on ujamaa,
something must be said about Nyerere’s vision for rural development in
Tanzania. Following Nyerere’s 5 February 1967 Arusha Declaration,148 the
Tanzanian government put in motion its President’s “African” socialist rural
development plan.149 Although villagization began in the early 1960s as part of  a
strategy to break Tanganyikan dependency on Britain, total collectivization did
not begin until Nyerere published “Socialism and Rural Development.”150
Nyerere based his vision for socio-economic reorganization on his idealized per-
ception of  traditional pre-colonial African family life, which he named ujamaa for
“extended family.”151 Central features of  the ujamaa communes were mutual
respect, shared property, obligatory labor, and self-reliance.152 Nyerere stated
that in traditional African life “the people were equal, they cooperated together,
and they participated in all the decisions which affected their lives.”153 However,
it must be stressed here that Nyerere’s idea of  pre-colonial African society was
an invented tradition that merely drew inspiration from ideas of  traditional life
and not actualized traditional methods.154 He merely constructed an idyllic
“African essence” which he marketed to his people as tradition.
The Arusha Declaration outlined the ways in which this new “tradition-
ally inspired” system would come to “dominate the rural economy and set the
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social pattern for the country as a whole.”155 As Elisabeth Croll states, in an uja-
maa village system “all but the individual household plot is farmed
communally.”156 Even though this system was one of  “shared poverty,” Nyerere
aspired to modernize the traditional ujamaa structure to suit the country’s
demand for a vastly improved standard of  living.157
To accomplish this end, the Tanzanian President encouraged his people
to form economic and social communities “where people live together and work
together for the good of  all, and which are interlocked so that all of  the differ-
ent communities also work together in cooperation for the common good of  the
nation as a whole.”158 Nyerere also wanted to provide more accessible govern-
ment services such as schools, medical services, water, agricultural officers, and
transport facilities to Tanzania’s rural peoples in addition to increasing agricultur-
al production.159 While Nyerere believed that ujamaa cooperative villages would
break the colonial era “dependency” trend of  the production of  export crops,
there remains a considerable debate on whether ujamaa succeeded in improving
the peasants’ standard of  living and breaking Tanzania’s dependency lifeline on
foreign sources.160
Social democratic historian Cranford Pratt supports what Nyerere
thought he was doing in Tanzania with ujamaa villagization.161 Pratt posits that any
assessment of  Nyerere’s socialism must recognize his commitments to Tanzanian
economic development, national control, participatory democracy, and equali-
ty.162 Pratt provides four reasons to support Nyerere’s Tanzanian socialism. First,
Pratt endorses Nyerere’s moral concern over the techniques used to achieve a
“unique” socialism. Pratt argues that Nyerere implemented leadership rules to
“provide a modern and relevant application” of  perceived traditional African val-
ues while seeking to exalt equality and root out colonial era social distinctions.163
Second, Nyerere devoted himself  to socialist ideals without revolution, a military
coup, or electoral victory. Third, Nyerere attempted to develop this socialism
along egalitarian, socialist, and democratic lines. According to Pratt, Nyerere
“chose socialism” primarily because it was in Tanzania’s “best interest to pursue
development along socialist lines.”164 Pratt asserts that by stressing individual lib-
erty, Nyerere succeeded in eliminating the gulf  between the rural peasants, urban
working class, and government elite.165 In essence, Nyerere knew that the coun-
try “would long be poor and that the building of  a just society would become
vastly more difficult if  ever class differences were entrenched.”166 Fourth, Nyerere’s
socialist ideology is genuinely indigenous and not an adaptation of  a foreign
dogma. Pratt lauds Nyerere’s qualities, such as his nationalism, opposition to
African oppression, and anti-dogmatism, as vehicles that led him to find a work-
able alternative to the industrialized states’ “neo-liberal policies.”167
In contrast, Marxists Issa Shivji and P.L. Raikes contest Pratt’s asser-
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tions through analyses of  Africa based upon Western capitalism and its develop-
ment from European feudalism.168 While Pratt is correct to state that no classical
class divisions ever existed at the national level, Shivji argues that the system of
social production in Africa is an essential cog in the world capitalist scheme.169
He posits that capitalism has taken on a completely different form in Africa,
which negatively affected the formation of  the rural peasantry.170 He states that
the introduction of  “cash crops” to Tanganyika “set in motion the process of
differentiation within the peasantry.”171 Although some peasants protected their
interests by “fraternizing with the bureaucracy,” internal and external dominating
classes took advantage and exploited the poor peasants.172 Because of  this dual
domination, the worker-peasant alliance emerges from “an analysis of  both the
working class and poor peasantry in relation to other classes, from their role in
social production, and their objective interests in conflict with imperialism and
its local class allies.”173 These already entrenched class differences, struggles, and
alliances “require indispensably a political organization” based on a proletarian
class-consciousness, which Pratt argues, does not exist.174
In the same vein, Raikes asserts that Tanzania “is a class society” since
the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”175 is and has been entrenched since independ-
ence.176 Nyerere intended his development plan to be a “strategy of  disengage-
ment from the world capitalist system” since a state that failed to nourish its
populace was powerless, dependent, and “potentially vulnerable to the dictates of
others.”177 However, nationalized ujamaa property fell into “the jaws of  a deeply
venal class of  vibwanyenye,” a Swahili term for the bourgeoisie.178 This same
bourgeoisie that administered Tanzania’s affairs also “distrusted the peasants’
intentions and capabilities” since democratically controlled ujamaa villages posed
“a real threat to their status” and “threaten[ed] their control.”179 Hyden supports
this claim, arguing that the petty-bourgeoisie in Africa “is clearly anxious, like
any other class, to create a power base of  its own and defend it.”180 Therefore,
Tanzania’s ujamaa policies must be regarded as a concerted effort on behalf  of
the ruling class to protect their high-class status.
In opposition, Marxist readings of  ujamaa that lambaste the bureaucrat-
ic bourgeoisie fail to recognize the antagonistic relationship between the peas-
antry and other classes.181 As Hyden notes, African peasants are self-sufficient
and have considerable control over the means of  agricultural production.182 Due
to their near-total disconnection from the core, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie’s
dependence on peasant production causes its members to focus on the acquisi-
tion of  outside capital to reverse the relationship of  dependency. Ujamaa failed,
in Hyden’s view, because the peasant mode of  production was “far too narrow
for a rapid socialist transformation.” Thus peasants became “unwilling and
unable” in their insurmountable struggle to meet the demands of  capitalism.183
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Political scientist Leander Schneider and historians Jean Francois Bayart
and Michael Schatzberg emphasize vertical leadership, paternalism, and displays
of  excessive force. Schneider emphasizes the negative repercussions of  the
TANU’s elitist attitude and use of  compulsion- explored further later on in this
section- when it forcefully relocated Tanzania’s rural population. Despite arguing
that ujamaa villagization was “throughout a well-intentioned policy,” he states
that the method of  villagization “was coercive and top-down, and it is generally
agreed that it did not improve the majority of  rural Tanzanians’ lot, as had been
hoped.”184 Furthermore, the TANU’s adoption of  coercive methods “points to
the authoritarian side of  Nyerere's rule.”185 The use of  persuasion, inducements,
and compulsion to ensure the successful experimentation of  ujamaa vijijini reveals
the ways in which the TANU elites and state officials regarded the rural peoples
as “backward, ignorant, and- in some instances- even ‘savage.’”186 In essence, the
TANU’s “developmentalist hierarchy” failed to raise the rural population’s stan-
dard of  living and widened the gulf  between the “civilized us” and the “back-
wards them.”
In addition, Bayart and Schatzberg emphasize the vertical nature of
post-colony rule in Africa. Bayart’s study focuses on African rulers’ monopoliza-
tion of  resources, namely food. Bayart refers to post-colonial African politics as
the “politics of  the belly: the idea of  accumulation, opening up possibilities of
social mobility, nepotism, corruption, and other methods of  dominance that
allow the holder of  power to ‘set himself  up.’”187 Schatzberg refines Bayart’s
“politics of  the belly” by arguing that the center’s distribution of  the resources serves
as an important locus of  their legitimacy as the “fatherchief.”188 Schatzberg
posits that a “moral matrix of  legitimate governance,” which is fundamentally
rooted in paternalistic/maternalistic rhetoric, propaganda, and metaphors, forms
the basis of  the “belly politics” of  Bayart’s groundbreaking study.189 For exam-
ple, a Swahili poem praised Nyerere for being the “first person to respond to the
needs of  the people” and compared the nation to an “infant wishing to be
breastfed.”190 Even though Nyerere’s “African” socialist ideology and hard-
working personality seemed incompatible with such metaphorical imagery, the
way he ruled Tanzania reflected his inner paternalism.191
The appreciation or depreciation of  Nyerere’s ujamaa ultimately
depends on what aspect of  the socio-economic policy scholars choose to high-
light. Pratt’s appreciation of  Nyerere’s ideas ignores the effects of  its practice on
the ground. Class divides existed and the feudal nature of  the core-periphery
relationship took the form of  a semi-colonial and semi-feudal elite-peasant
cleavage. However, strictly Marxist readings that lambaste the bureaucratic bour-
geoisie tend to overlook the antagonistic relationship between the peasantry and
other classes in Africa.192 The peasants’ self-sufficiency and control over the
means of  subsistence resulted in the bureaucratic bourgeoisie’s dependence on
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peasant production and, therefore, caused them to turn to outside capital to alle-
viate this constriction.193 This argument, however, fails to identify the paternalis-
tic nature of  rule in post-colonial Africa. Nyerere positioned himself  as the
“fatherchief ” and his government adopted a “top-down” attitude towards the
“national children,” which was embodied in Tanzania’s millions of  peasants. 
Despite their differences, these scholars agree that ujamaa was a com-
plete and total failure. Yet it is bizarre that with this consensus over ujamaa’s fail-
ings, Maoism is not drawn attention to as an insightful analysis to mete out the
plagues of  Nyerere’s failed socio-economic program. Maoism was certainly per-
vasive enough to circulate throughout work sites and universities in Tanzania.
Why have scholars devoted so little attention to Maoism in this regard? Is it due
to its heavily politicized nature? This paper sheds light on Maoist precepts,
namely Mao’s notions of  voluntarism, self-reliance, and a worker-peasant
alliance—all central to Babu’s critique of  Nyerere in particular and African
socialism in general—as serious insights to the socio-economic issues that ujamaa
failed to extinguish.194
Mao Zedong’s philosophical approach to Marxian analyses of  society
held practice, human experience, and human will as primaries. Mao placed “the
superstructure” over “the base” as the “location of  the motor of  history.”195 In
particular, Mao’s notion of  voluntarism, which held human will at its core,
inspired many willing participants during China’s Great Leap Forward period.
Contrary to Marxian theory, which came down firmly “on the side of  economic
determinism” through the emphasis of  development as the cause of  social
change, Mao advocated that the “human factor” was truly the primary driver for
such a transformation.196 Mao’s theory of  voluntarism, in particular, rather than
Marx’s premise of  economic determinism in general, revealed the Chinese
leader’s dependence on a revolutionary spirit within his people.197 Mao’s trans-
formation of  many of  China’s rural areas into communal places of  life and work
utilized a voluntaristic approach in which the peasants “were not alienated” but
encouraged to “stride forward on their own.”198 Mao thus created alternatives to
old and corrupt institutions and eventually won the “voluntary enthusiastic sup-
port” of  the vast majority of  the Chinese people.199
In the same vein, Schneider points out that Nyerere and the TANU ini-
tially regarded voluntarism, democratic principles, and local control as important
“means to the end of  the successful achievement of  the material goals of  devel-
opment.”200 Nyerere acknowledged voluntarism and local power as important
cogs in the moving wheels of  ujamaa vijijini.201 However, the reach of  such ideas
was very limited.202 On the ground, the communalization efforts proved to be
nothing more than a subterfuge for grouping peasants together to conveniently
and cost-efficiently facilitate various social services through total collectivization,
such as water, education, and seed distribution.203 Nyerere then launched
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“Operation Rufiji” and “Operation Dodoma” in 1970, both of  which forcefully
moved whole populations in those regions into planned villages if  they refused
to cooperate.204
The TANU’s enforced settlement of  the majority of  Tanzania's rural
population into seven thousand villages began in 1968 and the Party considered
the program “complete” by 1975.205 By 1973, ujamaa villagization forced the
resettlement of  “seventy percent of  the country’s rural population to ‘planned
villages.’”206 As production slowed and the peasantry wavered in its commit-
ment, Nyerere launched “Operation Tanzania” later that year. The mass reloca-
tion plan, described by historian Kelly Askew as the “largest on the African con-
tinent,” called for the relocation of  the entire rural population in Tanzania to uja-
maa villages.207 The program veered toward disaster near the end of  1975, thus
the TANU “severed the final thread with ideals of  voluntarism” and embraced
harsher forms of  compulsion as methods to force the ujamaa plan along.208
TANU forces destroyed the houses and used excessive methods of  compulsion
to force ninety-one percent of  Tanzania’s peasantry into villages.209
In addition, Nyerere called on the people of  Tanzania to “have great
confidence in themselves” and to preserve Tanzania’s autonomy.210 However,
the Tanzanian President later stated that eventually, the people “will lose their
enthusiasm and will look upon the independence government as simply another
new ruler.”211 Furthermore, Nyerere asserts that the people “will then sink back
into apathy - until the next time someone is able to convince them that their
own efforts can lead to an improvement in their lives.”212 Nyerere’s ujamaa villa-
gization soldiered on in spite of  heavy socio-economic costs. The end result was
a massive increase in Tanzania’s debt, strained relations between the urban and
rural peoples, as well as between Tanzania and its international donors, and cre-
ated a huge crisis in the country’s balance of  payment deficits to foreign contrib-
utors. It is for these reasons that an examination of  the notion of  self-reliance is
particularly salient.213
During the anti-imperialist struggle against invading Japanese forces,
Mao stated the importance of  China’s own national resources and its role as the
fuel of  the people’s revolution. He asserted that China stood for self-reliance and
that although the country “hope[d] for foreign aid [it] cannot be dependent on it; we
depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of  the whole army and the entire
people.”214 Mao wholeheartedly believed that China’s policy should rest on its own
strength, and that meant “regeneration through [its] own efforts.”215 As we can see, Mao
believed that the workers, peasants, and working intellectuals created the wealth
of  a society. Furthermore, three of  these important strata had to work collective-
ly to provide for the revolution in its continuance while making use only of
China’s national resources.216 By relying on one’s own strength, nations of  the
Global Maoism and the Politics of  Localization 27
LH 17_2 Quark Final ed_Left History.qxd  14-02-24  11:52 AM  Page 27
Third World could shed their dependency and reclaim the mandate to rule their
own lands.217
In Tanzania, Nyerere promoted the notion of  self-reliance as one of
the major themes of  the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration and ujamaa. Nyerere
stressed the idea of  self-reliance in the early 1960s, but he did not employ the
term until June 1965, after Chinese Foreign Minister and Premier Zhou En-lai’s
visit to Dar es Salaam.218 The Nyerere Government also emphasized the many
dangers of  dependence on foreign aid and encouraged self-reliance as the only
viable solution to Tanzania’s socio-economic development.219 However, the
TANU modified ujamaa to “conform closely [to] the preconceptions and inter-
ests of  the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who controlled its implementation.”220
Nyerere encouraged no “class struggle against the internal and external classes
with vested interests in maintaining and perpetuating the existing relations of
production.” Instead, many planned villages “were entirely integrated into the
previous dependency pattern of  production of  export crops.”221 Rather than pro-
duce surpluses for the peasants, ujamaa villagization facilitated the strenuous pro-
duction of  surplus for capitalist buyers in the developed world.222 As a result,
Nyerere’s ujamaa never developed a full-fledged plan for the overall transforma-
tion of  the economy. Thus, ujamaa reinserted Tanzania’s peasant communities
into the dependency economy of  colonization and turned the rural peasant pop-
ulation into a massive production force for outsider wants and needs.223
As for Mao’s notion of  a worker-peasant alliance, the Chinese
Chairman always championed the cause of  peasant revolution and, as China
became more industrialized, made room for the proletariat to emerge as the van-
guard class in China. Although Mao’s decision to adopt a universalist brand of
thought alienated his international followers from rural peasant-class societies,
his advocacy for a worker-peasant alliance eliminated the gulf  between the urban
and agrarian masses.224 Historian Stuart Schram states that Mao did not tie his
viewpoint “to the interests of  a single class at a single time,” but was “most pas-
sionately concerned with the fate of  the Chinese nation, and moreover with its
fate throughout all eternity.” 225 Mao stated in a 1949 speech that the “people’s
democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of  the working class, the peas-
antry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of  the workers
and the peasants because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 percent of  China’s
population.”226 Thus, a worker-peasant alliance exercised a dictatorship over the
reactionary classes who resisted socialist transformation and construction.227
One of  Tanzania’s most pressing endeavors was to try to diminish the
gulf  between rural and urban peoples and the areas in which they lived.
Historian John Saul argues that this was the Arusha Declaration’s “most impor-
tant aim” and the Mwogonzo guidelines in 1971 “provided ideological form for
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efforts to activate the necessary mass base of  Tanzania’s socialism.”228 Despite
explicitly advocating that the reason for the ujamaa policy was the need to thwart
the oppressive and reactionary classes, Nyerere and the Tanzanian Government
never consolidated an alliance between the proletariat and peasantry.229 Instead, the
Tanzanian President encouraged the maintenance of  “reactionary and divisive
classes” in ujamaa villages.230 Nyerere stated that Tanzanian peasants and work-
ers “must not… persecute the progressive farmers… Instead we must seek their
cooperation, and integrate them into the new socialist agriculture.”231 Under this
stipulation, the wealthy peasants, known as kulaks, could maintain their strangle-
hold on rural production.232 Therefore, Nyerere failed to narrow the gap
between the rich and poor, urban and rural classes in Tanzanian society.
Conclusion
Would Maoism be a catchall solution for all post-colonial quandaries? This paper
has made clear the effectiveness of  Mao’s principles, but does not assume that
such efficacy can be completely transposed to every country’s particular condi-
tions. However, Mao’s precepts succeeded in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial
case of  Peru. The Shining Path localized Mao Zedong’s principles by combining
them with Peru’s particular cultural forms. The Party also appropriated
Mariátegui’s notion of  indigenismo to consolidate further support from Quechua
peoples. Sendero gained strong peasant support in their millenarian struggle
against the Peruvian government by extolling the importance of  Andean culture
and symbolism, by promoting the advancement of  indigenous rights, and by
tracing threads between the present struggle and past Peruvian attempts to end
the unjust oppression of  the Peruvian people. Contemporary scholars may fall
into a temporal trap by merely foregrounding the fact that the Peruvian Maoists
resorted to terrorism, cocaine trafficking, and extreme violence in their waning
years of  resistance, but the Shining Path successfully confronted the crooked
Peruvian Government and made concerted efforts to improve the indigenous
peoples’ and peasants’ standards of  living.
In the Tanzanian case, however, Nyerere and the Tanzanian
Government sought to forge a unique political ideology based on Nyerere’s ide-
alized version of  traditional “African” notions of  family and community.
Nyerere’s socialism- embodied in his socio-economic program of  ujamaa vjijini-
sought to shatter Tanzania’s chain of  dependency and to create a country that
was productive, self-reliant, and egalitarian. While Mwalimu’s ideas were remark-
able, what actually happened on the ground was a total disaster. Thus, ujamaa
exacerbated existing societal divisions, overworked the peasantry, reified the gulf
between urban and rural, and effectively threw the country into a form of  cycli-
cal neo-colonial dependency. To conclude, the Peruvian case and the Tanzanian
counter-example provide insight into the importance of  global Maoism, the dif-
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ficulty in reconciling theory and practice, and the efficacy of  “particularizing the
universal” in settings disparate of  its origin.
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